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ABSTRACT
In a two-period model, economists such as K.J. Arrow, A.C. Fisher, and C. Henry, have
shown that when development is both indivisible and irreversible, a developer who ignores the
possibility of obtaining new information about the outcome of such development will invariably
underestimate the benefits of preservation and hence favor development.  In this note, I extend
the AFH analysis in two directions.  I model the land development problem in a dynamic
framework, explicitly specifying an information production function.  In such a setting, I then ask
and answer the question concerning when development should take place. 
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1.  Introduction
Since the seminal papers of Weisbrod (1964), Arrow and Fisher (1974), and Henry
(1974), resource economists have been interested in the concept of option value.  The so-called
AFH concept of option value tells us that when development is both indivisible and irreversible,
a developer who  ignores the possibility of obtaining new information about the consequences
of such development will invariably underestimate the benefits of preservation and hence skew
the binary choice development decision in favor of development. 
This simple and yet powerful result has been shown to hold in its most general form in
a two-period setting.  However, the result typically does not hold in more general settings.  It has
already been shown by Epstein (1980) and Hanemann (1989) that when the development decision
is divisible, this bias toward development need not arise; indeed, it will not arise unless the
development benefit function is of a rather specific form.  Similarly, one can ask about the nature
of the development decision when this decision is made in an intertemporal setting.  Because the
AFH analysis is conducted in a two-period model, the relevant development question is “Do I
develop today or tomorrow?”  In a dynamic setting, this question must be changed to “When do
I develop?”  This follows from the fact that the decision problem is not over two periods but over
a much longer time horizon.  A purpose of this note is to extend the AFH analysis and answer
the “When do I develop?” question. 
As Hanemann (1989) has noted, the AFH option value is a conditional value of perfect
information.  In other words, it is the informational gain achieved when choosing the second2
period development level, conditional on not having developed, i.e., preserved in the first period.
Given this intimate connection between option value and the value of information, it would
appear to be necessary to specify how information is generated in the development choice
problem.  However, this has typically not been done.  As a result, Hanemann (1989, p. 36) has
remarked that “. . . the specification of the information production function is certainly an
interesting area for further research.”  Given this, the second purpose of this note is to specify an
information production function. 
I now follow Ross (1970, pp. 180-90; 1983, pp. 51-7) and discuss the optimal stopping
framework which I shall use to analyze the “When do I develop?” question posed above. 
2. The Theoretical Framework
I shall first describe the infinitesmal look ahead stopping rule (ILASR) and a theorem
which provides conditions under which it is optimal to stop using ILASR. As Ross (1970, p. 188)
has noted, the ILASR can be thought of as a policy which stops a stochastic process precisely in
those states for which stopping immediately yields a higher payoff than waiting an additional
time h.  Let S be the set of states for which stopping immediately yields a higher payoff than
waiting an additional time h.  It can be shown that 
Theorem 1:  (Ross, 1970, p. 188):  If S is closed, i.e., once a stochastic process enters S, the
process cannot exit S, then under certain regularity conditions, the ILASR is optimal. 
The land development problem can now be cast in an optimal stopping framework.  This
will enable me to use Theorem 1 to determine when development should take place.  I proceed







develop a certain parcel of land.  Following AFH, I assume that this development decision is
indivisible.  The developer solves his problem in a dynamic and stochastic framework.  The
framework is stochastic because the decision to develop depends fundamentally on the
availability of information regarding the consequences of development; this information is
produced according to a nonhomogeneous Poisson process   with a continuous,
nonincreasing intensity function    Information is acquired independently, and this
information has a common cumulative distribution function   with finite mean.  By allowing
the information acquisition process to follow a nonhomogeneous Poisson process, I am leaving
open the possibility that it is more likely that information will be received at certain times than
at other times.  Since the production of information is typically the result of R&D activities which
generate results in an unpredictable manner, allowing for the above possibility would appear to
be necessary.  I make the natural assumption that any information that is not used immediately
in deciding whether or not to develop, can be stored and used subsequently.  The specific source
of information production is not critical to my analysis.  It could be the result of in-house R&D
activities by the developer or it could be the result of research undertaken by other public or
private agencies.  In any event, from the perspective of the developer, information is costly to
acquire; as such, in what follows, I will incorporate this cost in the overall decision problem faced
by the developer. 
Upon acquiring information, the developer decides whether to develop his land or to
preserve it and wait for additional information.  Let   be the continuous and strictly monotone
function which maps information to revenue from development.  That is, if   is the information
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to develop has been made.  Further, since   is a continuous and strictly monotone
transformation of   it follows that f is itself a nonhomogeneous Poisson process with a
continuous and nonincreasing intensity function, say,   (see Wolff, 1989, p. 26 for details).
Further, the “revenues” are independent, with cumulative distribution function    This
distribution function also has a finite mean. 
Should the developer choose not to develop his parcel of land, he incurs benefits and
costs.  The benefits are the obvious AFH type benefits; the developer preserves the flexibility to
acquire new information in the future.  The costs arise from the fact that the developer has to pay
to obtain information, and he loses the revenue from development.  I will denote the net benefit
per unit of time from not developing (preserving) by  . 
The state of the process at any time is denoted by the pair   where t is the
time, i is the highest quality information received by time t, and f = f(i) is the revenue that would
be received if the developer chooses to develop upon receiving i.  Thus, it is clear that if the
developer develops in state   the developer's receipts from t onwards are f.  On the
other hand, if the developer preserves his land and waits an additional time h, then his expected
receipts are 
(1)
where   is the expectation operator and Y is a random variable representing the development
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Given (2), it follows that the developer should cease to preserve his land and develop it upon
acquiring information i if and only if the revenue from developing now, i.e., at time t, exceeds
the expected revenue from postponing development by an additional time h. In other words,
development should proceed now if and only if
(3)
Canceling the common terms on both sides of (3), dividing both sides of (3) by h and then letting 
yields
(4)
as the condition for determining whether development should proceed immediately.  From (4),
I can define the set S, i.e., the set of all states for which stopping immediately (developing now)
yields a higher payoff than waiting an incremental time h (developing later/preserving).  This set
is
(5)
Note that S is closed because as t increases,   does not increase and the integral does not
increase as well.  I can now apply Theorem 1 and conclude that the developer should develop at
time t if and only if the revenue from developing is f, where   and f solves 
(6)
In other words, development should take place at  t, if, probabilistically speaking, it does not pay
to wait and learn for an additional period of time. f{i(t)},
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3. Conclusions
In this note I modeled the land development question in a dynamic and stochastic
framework.  In this setting, I provided an answer to the “When do I develop?” question.  This
answer involved a comparison of the returns obtainable from developing at time t, i.e., 
with the expected returns to be obtained by preserving and waiting for new information beyond
time  t. 
The analysis of this note can be generalized in a number of directions.  I suggest two
possible extensions.  First, one could consider the divisible development question in a context
similar to that of this note.  This extension will enable one to determine whether the possibility
of acquiring new information (learning) truely skews the development decision in favor of
increased preservation in the most general case.  Second, one could consider alternate
specifications of the information production function.  In this note, I have provided a simple
specification for the information production function in which information is produced in
accordance with a nonhomogeneous Poisson process.  More general specifications will permit
more elaborate analyses of the connections between information production and land
development. 7
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